Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in the Supervisor by Cheng, Ta-Tung
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
Accountancy Dissertations School of Accountancy 
5-4-2020 
Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in 
the Supervisor 
Ta-Tung Cheng 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss 
Recommended Citation 
Cheng, Ta-Tung, "Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in the Supervisor." 
Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2020. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/24 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accountancy Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
1 
 
    
 
 
 
Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in the Supervisor  
 
 
BY 
 
 
Ta-Tung (Stephanie), Cheng 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2020 
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Ta-Tung (Stephanie), Cheng 
2020 
  
3 
 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Ta-Tung (Stephanie), Cheng Dissertation Committee.  It 
has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson 
College of Business of Georgia State University. 
 
 
 Richard Phillips, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
Dr. Ivo Tafkov (chair), Dr. Michael Majerczyk, Dr. Flora Zhou, and Dr. Jeffrey Hales (external) 
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in the Supervisor 
 
BY 
 
Ta-Tung (Stephanie), Cheng 
 
April 27, 2020 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Ivo Tafkov 
 
Major Academic Unit: School of Accountancy 
 
Relative performance information (RPI) is commonly provided or available in many organizations. While RPI can 
be viewed as a control that firms use to influence employee effort and performance, the presence of RPI may also 
encourage employees to seek advice from the supervisor, which in turn breeds employees’ trust in the supervisor. 
This study investigates how RPI influences employee advice-seeking as well as how such advice-seeking affects 
trust in the supervisor. Using a laboratory experiment, I find that RPI motivates the non-bottom performing 
employees (i.e. top and middle performers) to seek advice from their supervisor more frequently whereas the bottom 
performing employees are not significantly affected by RPI to seek advice. I also find that the non-bottom 
performing employees’ advice-seeking frequency positively influences their trust in the supervisor. Mediation 
analysis reveals that RPI has a positive effect on the non-bottom performing employees’ trust in the supervisor and 
this positive effect is mediated by their advice-seeking behavior. I discuss the implications of my findings for 
accounting theory and practice.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Advice is the informational input from others that allows decision makers to consider 
new information, to avoid mistakes, and to make better decisions (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In 
the workplace where information is incomplete, employees can benefit from seeking advice as it 
often leads to an improvement in work performance, which in turn, benefits the organization 
(Nadler et al. 2003). Prior studies show that employees frequently prefer to seek advice from 
their supervisor rather than their peers because employees perceive their supervisor as more 
knowledgeable (Morrison 1993; Nadler et al. 2003) and more capable of providing useful 
information (Hanser and Muchinsky 1978; Greller and Herold 1975). It becomes crucial for 
employees needing advice to proactively seek it because the supervisor might not be aware of 
their problems or circumstances (Gibbons et al. 2003; Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In this study, I 
investigate whether and how the presence of relative performance information (RPI) influences 
the extent to which employees seek advice from their supervisor. 
It is important to study the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking. Prior research 
documents that RPI is often available in many organizations, and it motivates employees to 
increase effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013). However, a potential downside of RPI is 
that it also motivates employees to withhold knowledge or share inaccurate knowledge with their 
peers as RPI induces competitive behaviors among employees (Schnieder et al. 2018; Berger et 
al. 2018). Assuming RPI reduces knowledge-sharing among competing employees, seeking 
advice from a supervisor becomes pivotal as a supervisor can provide an efficient venue for 
employees to acquire useful information that helps to improve their work performance. 
Therefore, I investigate whether the presence of RPI may motivate employees to seek advice 
from their supervisor.  
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In addition to studying the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking, I examine how 
advice-seeking influences the relationship between employees and the supervisor. Specifically, I 
investigate whether advice-seeking allows for the development of trust in the supervisor, which 
is an important dimension in employee-supervisor relationships. Employees’ trust in the 
supervisor is crucial (Fulk et al. 1985; Dirk and Ferrin 2002) as Edelman Trust Barometer (2019) 
indicates that “Investing in employee trust is investing in your bottom line.”.  Prior literature also 
reveals that trust in the supervisor positively influences employees’ perceived fairness of 
performance evaluation (Fulk et al. 1985), organizational citizenship behavior (Dirks and Ferrin 
2002), and task performance (Colquitt et al. 2007). Forbes (2017) points out that one of the 
challenges which managers face today is establishing a relationship of trust with their 
employees; thus, information or methods for inducing trust is necessary. As such, knowing 
whether advice-seeking may cultivate a trusting relationship provides firms with relevant 
implications regarding how RPI may be utilized to foster employees' trust in the supervisor.   
I draw on psychology theory to predict that the presence of RPI will motivate employees 
to seek advice from their supervisor more frequently. Prior literature shows that RPI has a 
motivational effect on employee effort and performance, even when employees’ compensation is 
not tied to the performance of their peers (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013). According to 
Social Comparison Theory (Festinger 1954; Suls and Wheeler 2000), the motivation effect 
occurs because individuals have a drive to compare themselves to others and are eager to 
maintain a positive self-image. To increase the chances of achieving a better ranking, employees 
are likely to go the extra mile and solicit useful information from others. To the degree that 
advice-seeking behavior can be viewed as an additional costly action toward searching for useful 
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information, employees are more likely to seek advice from their supervisor when RPI is present 
compared to when RPI is absent.  
I also posit that employees who receive RPI will display more trust toward a supervisor 
and this effect operates through the frequency of advice-seeking.  Supervisors often provide 
useful information; therefore, by seeking advice, employees have the opportunity to reap the 
benefits of useful information. Due to Fundamental Attribution Error theory (Ross 1997), 
employees are likely to attribute to some extent the supervisor’s behavior of providing useful 
information to dispositional factors (i.e., supervisor’s trustworthiness), instead of situational 
factors (i.e., the supervisor’s job responsibilities or duties). As employees will at least partially 
attribute the supervisor’s behavior to her inherent trustworthiness, I contend that trust in the 
supervisor is likely to be engendered by employee advice-seeking.  
To test my hypotheses, I conduct an experiment in which I manipulate between-subjects 
the presence of RPI (absent vs. present). Undergraduate students are assigned to the role of 
Employee, and a graduate student is assigned to the role of Manager. There are two stages in the 
experiment. In stage 1, employees make a series of production decisions across multiple rounds 
in order to maximize profit. In the RPI absent condition, employees are informed of their 
individual performance information. In the RPI present condition, employees are informed of 
their individual performance as well as the relative performance ranking. Employees in all 
conditions are given the opportunity to seek advice from their manager who possesses useful 
information about the task. Employees are paid with the earned profits and thus, in my setting, 
employees’ compensation is not tied to the performance of their peers. The manager is paid with 
a fixed pay. The primary dependent variable in stage 1 is the frequency of advice-seeking. 
Participants maintain their roles in stage 2 and are introduced with an investment game (Berg et 
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al. 1995; Garrett et al. 2019). The investment game is utilized in order to capture employees’ 
trust in the supervisor. Specifically, I employ a strategy method and ask employees to indicate 
the amount that they are willing to invest if they are selected to receive an endowment from the 
experimenter. Employees are also asked to estimate the percentage of return that they believe the 
manager would share with them. The primary dependent variable is the expected percentage of 
return, which is a proxy for employees’ trust in the supervisor (Garrett et al. 2019).  
Results show that the employees seek advice from the supervisor more frequently when 
RPI is present compared to when RPI is absent. However, this result is driven by the non-bottom 
performing employees (i.e., top and middle performers) whereas bottom performing employees 
are not significantly influenced by RPI to seek advice. The frequency of advice-seeking also 
positively influences the non-bottom performing employees’ trust in the supervisor. Specifically, 
the presence of RPI has a positive effect on their trust in the supervisor and this positive effect is 
mediated by the frequency of advice-seeking.  
This study has implications for both accounting research and practice. First, the study 
contributes to accounting research on advice-seeking. Prior research in accounting focuses on 
how individuals give advice (e.g., Leiby 2018) as well as how individuals weigh advice (e.g., 
Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013). Very few studies have investigated what factors influence 
employee advice-seeking (e.g., Brooks et al. 2015; Schaefer 2013; Morrison 1993). This study 
sheds light on employee advice-seeking by identifying a common institutional factor - the 
presence of RPI that influences employees’ decision to seek advice. While previous literature 
emphasizes how RPI affects interaction among competing peers (Wang 2017; Black et al. 2018; 
Berger et al. 2018; Schnieder et al. 2018), this study seeks to demonstrate that RPI also 
influences the interaction between employees and the supervisor, thereby suggesting that the 
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effect of RPI may be broader than previously documented in the literature. Specifically, while 
RPI may be perceived as a control that firms provide to influence employee effort and 
performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and be viewed as harmful to trust among employees 
(e.g., Schnieder et al. 2018), my study shows that RPI can also foster employees’ trust in the 
supervisor by encouraging employees to seek advice. Therefore, this paper adds to the stream of 
literature that investigates how controls may also be utilized to build trust within organizations 
(Coletti et al. 2005; Garrett et al. 2019).  
Finally, my results suggest that firms that provide RPI may consider offering additional 
mechanisms or incentives to encourage the bottom performing employees to seek advice as they 
are the ones who are most in need of advice but are least motivated by RPI to do so. For 
example, instead of merely providing information, the supervisor can offer extra assistance 
regarding how to utilize the information. This additional communication is important as although 
bottom performing employees may be aware that the supervisor can provide useful information, 
their poor rankings may prevent them from seeking advice due to lower self-efficacy regarding 
their ability to utilize such information. As advice-seeking helps to foster a trusting relationship 
within an organization, firms that do not provide RPI may consider offering other mechanisms 
that encourage employee advice-seeking.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the theory and 
hypotheses. In Section III, I describe the experimental design. The results are discussed in 
Section IV. Section V concludes. 
 
 
6 
 
II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
Advice-Seeking 
In the workplace, job-related information is often incomplete, and employees often lack 
the information necessary to perform their work more effectively and efficiently (Morrison 1993; 
Nadler et al. 2003). Such job-related information or work knowledge can also be difficult to 
acquire through mere observation. Additionally, some important information may only be 
available to the supervisor and employees do not always have access to such information. 
Seeking advice thus becomes pertinent to employees’ success in the organization as it helps 
employees to facilitate the fulfillment of job requirements or to achieve excellence in their 
positions.  
Prior literature finds that employees frequently seek advice from their supervisor rather 
than their peers (Morrison 1993; Nadler et al. 2003). Employees typically perceive that their 
supervisor is more knowledgeable and possesses information that helps to reduce the level of 
uncertainty faced by employees. As employees usually have a better understanding regarding 
when they need advice, it is crucial for employees who need advice to proactively seek advice. 
Furthermore, the supervisor can be wary of providing unsolicited advice (Gibbons et al. 2003; 
Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Unsolicited advice is often perceived as intrusive, and knowing this 
hostile potential, people are hesitant to give unsolicited advice (Gibbons et al. 2003). Unsolicited 
advice is also often discounted more frequently than solicited advice, and knowing this possible 
discounting effect, people are less willing to give effortful, unsolicited advice (Bonaccio and 
Dalal 2006).  
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Despite the benefits as well as the importance of advice-seeking, employees are     
reluctant to seek advice even when they need it. Particularly, Brooks et al.’s (2015) experiment 
reveals that people withhold their action of seeking advice as they are worried about appearing 
incompetent. It is important to understand how firms can motivate employees' effort to seek out 
useful information from the supervisor, as advice-seeking tends to require additional effort. One 
potential way is by providing RPI, as prior studies have suggested that RPI motivates additional 
costly action (e.g., effort) (Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013).  
Relative Performance Information 
RPI provides employees with information about how they perform on a task relative to 
other employees and is common in various organizations (Nordstrom et al. 1990; Song et al. 
2019). In my setting, employee compensation depends on individual performance and is 
independent from relative performance. As employees' compensation is not tied to the 
performance of their peers, conventional economic theory would predict that the presence of RPI 
will not influence employees’ effort or their advice-seeking behavior. (Frederickson 1992; 
Hannan et al. 2008). However, RPI may act through a behavioral mechanism that influences 
employee advice-seeking.  
Prior literature shows that RPI has a motivational effect on employees’ effort and 
performance even when their compensation is not tied to the performance of peers (Hannan et al. 
2008; Tafkov 2013). According to Social Comparison Theory, this motivational effect arises as 
individuals try to compare themselves favorably with others and desire to keep a positive self-
image (Festinger 195; Suls and Wheeler 2000). While economic theory suggests that people only 
compete for monetary rewards, social comparison theory argues that people also compete for 
non-monetary rewards such as performance pride and self-image (Smith 2000). Individuals exert 
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a higher level of effort when RPI is present as they seek to compare favorably to others and to 
maintain a positive self-image. For example, Tafkov (2013) shows that RPI encourages 
employees to increase effort. Song et al. (2018) also demonstrate that providing physicians with 
public RPI motivates their effort in learning the best practice. In Chan’s (2018) experiment 
where workers can invest in costly overtime work, the author finds that RPI encourages more 
overtime work. Building upon prior literature, I posit that employees will be attentive to RPI 
provided to them and will have a drive to improve their rankings even when their compensation 
is not tied to the ranking. To increase their chances of achieving a higher rank, employees with 
RPI are more likely to seek useful information from the supervisor compared to employees 
without RPI.   
In summary, advice-seeking requires effort and RPI motivates such effort. I draw on prior 
literature and contend that the presence of RPI will motivate employees to seek advice more 
frequently.  
H1: Employees will seek advice more frequently when RPI is present compared to when 
RPI is absent.  
 
Advice-Seeking and Trust in the Supervisor   
Supervisors often provide useful information to their employees (Hanser and Muchinsky 
1978; Greller and Herold 1975).  I contend that such useful information can influence 
employees’ trust in their supervisor. When employees seek advice and the supervisor provides 
useful information, employees can attribute this behavior (i.e., providing useful information) to 
either dispositional (e.g., the supervisor’s trustworthiness) or situational factors (e.g., the 
supervisor’s job responsibilities and duties). Prior studies show that individuals tend to over 
attribute others’ behavior to dispositional characteristics than to situational factors due to 
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Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross 1997). For example, Coletti et al. (2005) and Garrett et al. 
(2019) provide evidence that control-induced cooperation leads to perceived trustworthiness of 
the collaborators despite the fact that the cooperation is induced by the control system. I argue 
that when the supervisor provides useful information, employees will at least partially attribute 
this behavior to the supervisor’s inherent trustworthiness instead of the supervisor’s job 
responsibilities or duties. Consequently, employees are likely to perceive the supervisor as 
trustworthy.1  
I further contend that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences employees’ 
trust in the supervisor. The reason is that, by seeking advice, employees are able to develop a 
reinforcing belief regarding the supervisor’s trustworthiness through the repeated interactions. 
Prior literature reveals that a trusting relationship may evolve from repeated interactions 
(Gabarro 1978; Gulati 1995). Specifically, the trusting relationship between employees and the 
supervisor may derive from repeated interactions through which expectations are formed and 
beliefs are reinforced (Gabarro 1978). Such expectations yield a knowledge-based trust, which is 
a perception that the interacting partner will continue to behave in accordance with the 
expectations (Gulati 1995). In a similar vein, Coletti et al. (2005) suggest that individuals update 
their perception of the partner’s trustworthiness based on their interaction histories. Garrett et al. 
(2019) also document that one’s trusting belief in an interacting partner depends on the amount 
of cooperation with the same partner in prior interactions. Provided that the supervisor imparts 
useful information and employees at least partially attribute this behavior to the supervisor’s 
trustworthiness, repeated interactions allow employees to form a history and reinforce their 
 
1 Using a laboratory experiment, Özer et al. (2018) find that information sharing as well as advice 
provision leads to trust in the party who shares such information.  
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perception of the supervisor’s trustworthiness. As such, the frequency of advice-seeking 
positively influences the extent to which employees judge the supervisor to be trustworthy.  
H2: The frequency of advice-seeking will positively influence the extent to which 
employees judge the supervisor to be trustworthy.   
 H1 predicts that RPI motivates employees to seek advice from the supervisor and H2 
predicts that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences employees’ trust in the 
supervisor. Combining these arguments, I predict that the effect of RPI on trust in the supervisor 
is positive and will be mediated by employee advice-seeking.  
H3: Employee advice-seeking will mediate the relation between RPI and trust in the 
supervisor.  
It is worth noting that without advice-seeking, the mere presence of RPI may adversely 
affect the perceived trustworthiness of a supervisor. Indeed, RPI establishes a competitive 
environment that makes individuals perceive other people as untrustworthy (Black et al. 2018; 
Berger et al. 2018; Schnieder et al. 2018; Sassenberg et al. 2007). For example, Sassenberg et al. 
(2007) find that the competitive mindset induced by RPI has a carry-over effect on others who 
were not involved in the competition. As a result, in the absence of advice-seeking, the mere 
presence of RPI may have a negative impact on trust in the supervisor.  
The predictions are graphically presented in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 1 here    
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III. METHOD 
To test the hypotheses, I use a between-subject experimental design. The experiment is 
computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). There are two stages in the 
experiment. In stage 1, I manipulate the presence of RPI (absent vs. present) and observe 
employees’ advice-seeking behaviors. In stage 2, employees perform an investment game, in 
which I apply a strategy method to solicit responses regarding employees’ trust in the supervisor. 
See Figure 2 for the experimental timeline.  
Insert Figure 2 here    
Participants and Procedure  
Participants in this study are undergraduate and graduate students from a large public 
university in the United States. There are ten participants in an experimental session, consisting 
of nine employees and one manager who serves as a control throughout experimental sessions. I 
run 6 sessions with nine employees each, resulting in 54 observations in total. 
All participants are informed that undergraduate students are assigned to the role of 
Employee and the graduate student is assigned to the role of Manager. Instead of assigning roles 
based on performance-based criteria, this role assignment process allows me to better test my 
theory by proactively preventing employees from viewing the manager as a competitor before 
the experiment begins. As Douthit and Majerczyk (2019) suggest that employees’ perception of 
the manager’s legitimacy can influence their subsequent behavior, assigning a graduate student 
to a senior role also helps maintain the fairness of the assigning process and establish the 
perceived legitimacy of the role in a lab environment.  
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Because characteristics of the advisor may influence individuals’ perceptions of role 
legitimacy and their decisions to seek advice (Brooks et al. 2005, Heikensten & Isaksson 2019), 
the role of Manager is played by the same graduate student2 in all experimental sessions to serve 
as a control. Doing so also allows me to reduce the noise that may arise in different sessions if 
the roles are played by different individuals.  
At the beginning of each experimental session, all participants are seated at their 
respective individual computer terminals in the lab. Next, participants are instructed to sign a 
consent form, read the instructions, and take a quiz to ensure that they understood the 
instructions. Then, they work on the experimental tasks. After finishing the tasks, participants 
answer a post-experimental questionnaire that contains some questions related to their decision 
process and demographic information. At the end of each session, participants are paid their 
earnings from the experiment in US dollars.  
Experimental Task 
In stage 1, the experimental task is adapted from Sprinkle (2000). Specifically, 
employees make a series of production quantity decisions across multiple rounds in order to 
maximize the amount of Lira (an experimental currency) earned in the experiment. As shown in 
Figure 3, the amount of Lira earned for a production decision is determined jointly by production 
quantity decision and the economic condition. The economic condition ranges from 1 to 20 with 
equal probability and remains constant for each of the five periods within a round. While the 
economic condition may vary across rounds, each participant faces the same set of economic 
 
2 The same graduate student attends all experimental sessions and thus is aware of the manipulations. The 
manager’s behavior is not the purpose of this study and her response is also not included in the analysis.  
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conditions in the same order3. Participants are also informed that they face the same set of 
economic conditions.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
Employees are given 220 seconds to complete the five periods in a round. The 220 
seconds include 180 seconds of decision time and 40 seconds of feedback-viewing time. At the 
end of periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 within a trial, employees are given 10 seconds to view the feedback 
on their past performance. Specifically, they can see the amount of Lira they earn from each of 
their previous decisions within that round. Such information allows employees to make 
inferences regarding the unknown economic condition for that round. The 40 seconds (=10 
seconds x 4 times) of feedback-viewing time is mandatory and a clock is displayed on the 
computer screen. Employees are given the opportunity to practice the task before they proceed to 
the real task.  
RPI Manipulation  
In the RPI absent condition, the manager sends individual performance feedback to each 
employee at the end of each trial. Specifically, the manager sends individual feedback regarding 
the sum of the total Lira each employee has earned in all rounds that s/he has completed. In the 
RPI present condition, the manager sends individual performance information to each employee 
as well as each employee’s relative performance ranking on the experimental task. Because there 
are nine employees in a session, employees are ranked from 1 to 9 based on the sum of the total 
Lira each employee has earned compared to that earned by the other eight employees4. 
 
3 To enhance experimental control, I randomly selected the economic condition for each round before the 
experiment sessions.   
4 If there is a tie between two employees, the computer determines their relative rankings by adding a 
random number. This same logic applies to a tie among multiple employees.  
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Employees are able to view their own ranking as well as fellow employees’ rankings from their 
computer screens. See Figure 4 for the example.     
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
Advice-Seeking  
During stage 1 of the experiment, employees in all conditions are given the opportunity 
to seek advice from the manager. Employees are made aware that their manager possesses useful 
information which could help them narrow the range of the economic condition of each round. 
While the economic condition ranges from 1 to 20, advice, if sought, can cut this range to 8. For 
example, if the economic condition in a given round is 11 and an employee chooses to seek 
advice, s/he would receive a message such as “The information I have suggests that the economic 
condition of the current round ranges from 5 to 12”. If advice is sought, an employee could 
make better inferences regarding the unknown economic condition. Hence, the advice, once 
sought, should help employees avoid making mistakes and enhance the quality of their decision-
making process.  
Before employees make their first output quantity decisions, they are asked whether they 
want to seek advice for a given round. Each employee has five opportunities to seek advice 
within a round– (1) before making the 1st period decision (2) before making the 2nd period 
decision, (3) before making the 3rd period decision, (4) before making the 4th period decision, 
and (5) before making the 5th period decision. Since the economic condition remains constant for 
each of the five decision periods, employees are allowed to seek advice only once per round.  
See Figure 5 for five intervals during which employees could seek advice within a round.  
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Insert Figure 5 here  
Employees are informed that because the economic condition varies from round to round, 
the advice sought also varies from round to round. However, employees who seek advice receive 
the same advice as the other advice-seeking employees within a given round. Employees who 
request advice receive the same advice to ensure that the quality of advice remains constant to all 
advice-seeking employees, thus ensuring that the ranking information is perceived as fair and 
meaningful to the employees.  
The manager is able to identify which employee has sought advice as well as how many 
times each employee has sought advice. Specifically, the manager receives a summary at the end 
of each round regarding how many times each employee has sought advice. Employees are also 
informed that the manager receives such a report. The purpose of this design choice is to 
implement the social cost of advice-seeking. Also, in reality, the advisor often can identify who 
has sought advice. Employees, on the other hand, are not able to observe their peers’ advice-
seeking behaviors. Doing so allows me to have a stronger manipulation of RPI because if the 
employees could observe their peers’ advice-seeking behaviors, their advice-seeking behaviors 
may also be influenced by their peers5.  
Employees are compensated based on their performance on the experimental task plus 
any time bonus. The performance on the experimental task is the sum of the total Lira that an 
employee has earned over the six rounds. Additionally, an employee earns $0.01 for every 5 
seconds that s/he finishes a round before 220 seconds has expired. If an employee chooses to 
seek advice, his or her screen would be frozen for an additional 15 seconds. The remaining time 
 
5 As such, their advice-seeking behavior may be driven by peer effect, RPI, or both.  
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affects how much time bonus an employee could get in each round. The time bonus mechanism 
is utilized to make advice-seeking costly.  
Employee compensation = Sum of the total Lira + Time Bonus  
The manager’s compensation is a fixed pay and, thus, is not tied to the performance of 
employees.  
The primary dependent variable is the frequency of advice-seeking. Recall that each 
employee is given the opportunity to seek advice once per round. As there are six rounds in stage 
1, the maximum amount of advice one may have received is six. The frequency of advice-
seeking is calculated using the following formula:  
Frequency of Advice Seeking =  
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒   
6
 
❖ The number of times an employee has sought advice ranges from 0 to 6 for each 
employee.  
❖ The maximum number of times an employee can seek advice is 6.  
 
Investment Game    
In stage 2, participants maintain their roles and are introduced with an investment game. 
Specifically, participants are told that one of nine employees would be randomly selected to 
receive an endowment of 500 Lira. The selected employee can keep the endowment or invest in 
a project being conducted by the manager. Each Lira that employee invests results in three Lira 
of return. Employees are informed that the manager has the right to keep all of the returns from 
the investment, but the manager also has the choice to share any amount of the returns with the 
employee. Specifically, the manager is given the opportunity to share a percentage of the return, 
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ranging from 0% to 100%. The manager makes her sharing percentage decision before the 
employee is selected.  
I apply a strategy method to solicit responses regarding employees’ trust in the 
supervisor. Each employee is asked to indicate how much s/he would be willing to invest 
(Invest), if s/he were to be selected. Each employee is also asked to estimate the percentage of 
return (Expected_ Return) that s/he believes the manager would share with him/her. Employees 
are clearly informed that the manager is not made aware of their responses to either question. 
Each employee is told that his/her response to the investment amount will be the real investment 
if s/he is selected to receive an endowment. The primary dependent variable is the expected 
percentage of return, which is a proxy for an employee’s trust in the supervisor (Garrett et al. 
2019).  
The employee’s compensation in stage 2 is calculated using the following formula:  
(1) If the employee is selected to be endowed with 500 Lira 
Employee Compensation = 500 Lira – Investment + Total Return x Percentage of 
Return   
❖ Investment ranges from 0 to 500 Lira. 
❖ Percentage of Return ranges from 0% to 100%, and is determined by the manager.  
 
 (2) If the employee is NOT selected to be endowed with 500 Lira 
Employee Compensation = 0  
 
The supervisor’s compensation in stage 2 is calculated using the following formula:  
Manager Compensation = Total Return x (1 – Percentage of Return) 
❖ Total Return = Investment x 3  
❖ Percentage of Return ranges from 0% to 100%, and is determined by the manager.  
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IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 54 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. The undergraduate 
students’ average age was 19 years old, and 56 percent were female. Risk attitude and general 
trusting level were captured before participants started the experimental task. T-tests for mean-
comparison indicate insignificant differences on GPA, gender composition, risk attitude, and 
general trusting level between the two conditions (all p-values > 0.10, two-tailed).  
Test of H1 
H1 predicts that employees will seek advice more frequently when RPI is present 
compared to when RPI is absent. As reported in Table 1, Panel A, employees seek advice more 
often when RPI is present (average in RPI condition = 3.81 times or 63.58 percent of times) 
compared to when RPI is absent (average in No RPI condition = 2.48 times or 41.36 percent of 
times). T-test for mean-comparison is significant (t= 1.94, p=0.029, one-tailed), providing 
support for H1.  
 Recognizing that firms may be particularly interested as to whether RPI may motivate the 
bottom performing employees to seek advice as they are the ones who are most in need of 
advice, I further categorize employees into two groups – non-bottom performing employees and 
bottom performing employees – based on their relative performance in stage 1. Employees who 
are ranked 1 to 6 are non-bottom performing employees and employees who are ranked 7 to 9 are 
considered bottom performing employees. I then separately examine the effect of RPI on advice-
seeking within these two groups of employees.  
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Table 1, Panel B shows that the non-bottom performers seek advice more often when RPI 
is present (average in RPI condition = 5.33 times or 75.93 percent of times) compared to when 
RPI is absent (average in No RPI condition = 3.50 times or 49.07 percent of times). T-test for 
mean-comparison indicates that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is significant for the non-
bottom performers (t= 1.93, p=0.031, one-tailed). 
Table 1, Panel C presents the result for the bottom performers. Bottom performers seek 
advice on average 2.33 times (or 38.89 percent of the times) when RPI is present and 1.56 times 
(or 25.93 percent of the times) when RPI is absent. T-test for mean-comparison shows that the 
effect of RPI is insignificant for the bottom performers (t= 0.76, p=0.230, one-tailed).  
Insert Table 1 here 
Thus, although the initial analysis suggests that RPI motivates employees to seek advice 
from the supervisor, additional analyses reveal that the positive effect of RPI on employee 
advice-seeking is driven by the non-bottom performing employees. It also reveals that the bottom 
performing employees are not particularly motivated by RPI to seek advice from the supervisor6.  
Test of H2 
H2 predicts that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences the extent to which 
employees perceive the supervisor to be trustworthy. Table 2 reports the result from an ordinal 
logistic regression with expected return as the dependent variable and the frequency of advice-
 
6 When RPI is absent, non-bottom performing employees seek advice more often than the bottom 
performing employees (on average 3.5 times versus 1.56 times) but the difference is not significant 
(t=1.39, p=0.18, two-tailed). When RPI is present, non-bottom performing employees seek advice more 
frequently than the bottom performers (on average 4.56 times versus 2.33 times) and the difference is 
significant (t=2.30, p=0.03, two-tailed).  
20 
 
seeking as the independent variable. The effect of advice-seeking frequency is significant (𝑥2= 
1.32, p=0.094, one-tailed).  
As tests of H1 reveal that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is driven by the non-bottom 
performing employees, I further test the effect of advice-seeking frequency on the non-bottom 
performing employees’ trust in the supervisor. The result suggests that the effect of advice-
seeking frequency on the non-bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor is significant (𝑥2= 2.31, 
p=0.011, one-tailed). On the contrary, advice-seeking frequency has no significant impact on the 
bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥2= - 0.28, p=0.392, one-tailed). Simply put, advice-
seeking frequency positively influences the non-bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor but 
does not influence the bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor.  
Insert Table 2 here  
It is worth noting the possibility that individuals who possess a natural inclination to trust 
others may expect the manager to share a higher percentage of return regardless of the frequency 
of advice-seeking. To rule out this explanation, I control for the general trusting level that is 
measured before the experimental task is introduced. Result that is not tabulated shows that 
advice-seeking frequency continues to positively influence the non-bottom performing 
employees’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥2= 2.61, p<0.01, two-tailed) after controlling for their 
general trusting level7.  
Because participants’ compensation in stage 1 is tied to their individual performance, 
non-bottom performing employees who perform better and thus accumulate more wealth may be 
 
7 Participants indicate their responses to the six statements that are used to measure their general trusting 
level. For example, “Most people are basically honest.”, “Most people are trustworthy.”, “Most people are 
basically good and kind.” 
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more willing to invest a higher amount in stage 2 and subsequently expect a higher percentage of 
return from the manager. As a result, the higher expected return may be driven by the higher 
investment amount. To rule out this explanation, I control for the Investment amount. Result that 
is not tabulated shows that advice-seeking frequency continues to positively influence the non-
bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥2= 2.06, p=0.04, two-tailed) after controlling for the 
non-bottom performing employees’ investment amounts.   
To understand whether advice-seeking frequency influences the degree to which non-
bottom performing employees display work-related trust to the manager and/or feel more 
attached to the manager, I analyze the effect of advice-seeking on Work_Trust and Attachment 
respectively. Specifically, I measure Work_Trust by asking employees to answer "Would you 
trust working with this manager again?” using a Likert scale of 1-7 with 1 being not at all and 7 
being very much. I measure Attachment by asking employees to use a Likert scale of 1-7, with 1 
being not at all and 7 being very much, to indicate their response to the following statement 
"Please rate the extent to which you felt attached to your manager”. Table 3 presents the ordinal 
logistic regression results that show non-bottom performing employees who seek advice more 
frequently indeed display more work-related trust to the manager ( 𝑥2= 2.93, p<0.01, two-tailed) 
as well as feel more attached to the manager (𝑥2= 4.11, p<0.01, two-tailed).  
Insert Table 3 here  
Test of H3 
H3 predicts that employee advice-seeking will mediate the relation between RPI and trust 
in the supervisor. To test the mediation, I first follow Barron and Kenny (1986)’s causal 
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procedures and rely on multivariate regression analyses. I subsequently test mediation using the 
Sobel test as well as confidence intervals8.   
Table 4, Panel A presents the regression results for all employees. Panel A, Model 1 tests 
the total effect of RPI on expected return and shows an insignificant result (β=-0.009; p=0.493, 
one-tailed). This insignificant result is not surprising under an inconsistent mediation, meaning 
the direct effect has an opposite sign to the indirect effect. As suggested in Figure 1, although 
RPI might have a positive effect on trust in the supervisor through advice-seeking, the mere 
presence of RPI might have a negative effect on trust in the absence of advice-seeking. As such, 
Baron and Kenny (1986) point out that the total effect can be insignificant with an inconsistent 
mediation. Panel A, Model 2 tests the effect of RPI on advice-seeking frequency and Panel A, 
Model 3 tests the effect of advice-seeking frequency on trust. These results show that although 
RPI encourages employees to seek advice (β=0.875; p=0.041, one-tailed), advice-seeking 
frequency has a marginal impact on trust (β=0.744; p=0.094, one-tailed). Panel A, Model 4 
further shows that the frequency of advice-seeking has a marginal impact on trust in the 
supervisor after controlling for the presence of RPI ((β=0.853; p=0.08, one-tailed). Overall, these 
analyses lend a marginal support for the mediation relation.  
Insert Table 4 here  
However, tests in H1 and H2 reveal that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is driven by 
the non-bottom performing employees. It is possible that the mediation relation exists for the 
 
8 I followed Arnold and Artz (2015)’s paper and use causal method as well as Sobel test (p.70). I supplement my test 
results with confidence interval tests. I use 90% confidence interval test because the distribution of a^b^is skewed 
and that an assumption of normality will lead to inaccurate probability statements. I follow Chen and Bargh (1997)’s 
method and use 90% confidence interval instead. 
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non-bottom performing employees only instead of all employees. I then test the mediation for the 
non-bottom performing employees.  
Table 4, Panel B presents my results. Specifically, Panel B, Model 1 tests the total effect 
of RPI on expected return and shows an insignificant result (β=0.23; p=0.351, one-tailed). The 
insignificant total effect is expected with an inconsistent mediation where direct and indirect 
effect has an opposite sign. Panel B, Model 2 tests the effect of RPI on advice-seeking frequency 
for the non-bottom performing employees and suggests that they are motivated by RPI to seek 
advice (β=1.102; p=0.042, one-tailed). Panel B, Model 3 tests the effect of advice-seeking 
frequency on trust and shows that advice-seeking frequency positively influences the non-bottom 
performing employees’ trust in the supervisor (β=1.663; p=0.011, one-tailed). Finally, Panel B, 
Model 4 reveals that the frequency of advice-seeking significantly affects trust even after 
controlling for the presence of RPI (β=1.949; p=0.009, one-tailed). Taken together, these results 
fulfill the conditions described by Baron and Kenny (1986) for the mediation. As suggested by 
Baron and Kenny (1986), I additionally test whether the indirect effect from RPI over advice-
seeking to trust in the supervisor is significantly different from zero by performing a Sobel test 
(Goodman 1960). I find evidence for a significant effect (p<0.10). I further test the indirect effect 
using bootstrapping with 1,000 bootstrapped samples. Figure 6 presents the results. 
Bootstrapping analysis indicates that the 90% confidence interval for the indirect effect of RPI 
on trust through advice-seeking is entirely above zero (lower bound = 0.264; upper bound = 
11.446). The result is similar if I test the indirect effect using the Monte Carlo method (lower 
bound = 0.317; upper bound = 10.390). To sum up, my analyses suggest a mediation relation 
between RPI and trust in the supervisor for the non-bottom performing employees.  
Insert Figure 6 here  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I study the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking as well as the impact 
of advice-seeking on trust in the supervisor. I find that while the bottom performing employees 
are not particularly motivated by RPI to seek advice, the non-bottom performing employees seek 
advice more frequently when RPI is present compared to when RPI is absent. Additionally, the 
frequency of advice-seeking positively influences the extent to which the non-bottom performing 
employees display trust in their supervisor. Mediation analyses suggest that advice-seeking 
mediates the relation between RPI and trust in the supervisor for the non-bottom performing 
employees.  
My study contributes to accounting theory and practice in several ways. First, this study 
fills the gap of current RPI literature by investigating whether and how the presence of RPI also 
influences the interaction between employees and their supervisor. My study also adds to the 
stream of literature that examines how a control system may influence trust within organizations. 
This study gives an implication to practice by suggesting that firms that provide RPI may 
consider offering additional incentives (e.g., recognition) or assistance to encourage the bottom 
performing employees to seek advice as they are less motivated by RPI to do so but are most in 
need of advice.  
My study also suggests several opportunities for future research. First, employees can learn 
by seeking advice or by trial-and-error and it may be beneficial to investigate whether employee 
performance varies given different learning strategies and whether the effectiveness of learning 
strategies depend on task characteristics. Second, my results reveal that RPI did not have a 
significant effect on the bottom performing employees’ advice-seeking behavior. Future research 
is necessary to identify factors which motivate bottom performers to seek advice and/or factors 
25 
 
which prevent them from seeking advice. Third, in some situations, employees may observe their 
peers’ advice-seeking behavior, which further influences their own decisions in seeking advice. 
Future research may benefit from investigating how such peer effect influences employee advice-
seeking. Finally, future studies may benefit from an investigation evaluating how the perceived 
cost of providing or seeking advice influences advice-seeking. According to prior literature, when 
people seek advice they consider not only personal costs such as time and effort, but also the 
potential advisor’s cost of giving advice. Examining how the cost of seeking and giving advice 
affects whether or when an employee seeks advice from the advisor may be a worthwhile pursuit 
considering the established value and importance of advice seeking within an organization. 
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Figure 1 
Predictions  
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Figure 2 
Experimental Timeline 
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Figure 3  
 Lira Earnings Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Production Quantity  
 
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 5 5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 5 10 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 5 5 10 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 5 5 10 20 20 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 0 0 0 0 0 
16 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 95 0 0 0 0 
17 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 95 95 0 0 0 
18 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 95 95 95 0 0 
19 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 95 95 95 100 0 
20 5 5 10 20 20 30 30 30 45 45 60 60 60 80 80 95 95 95 100 100 
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Figure 4 
Example of Ranking Information  
PERFORMANCE RANK 
Participant Rank 
Participant_ID   1 1 
Participant_ID   2 7 
Participant_ID   3 2 
Participant_ID   4 3 
Participant_ID   5 8 
Participant_ID   6 9 
Participant_ID   7 6 
Participant_ID   8 5 
Participant_ID   9 4 
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Figure 5 
When Can Employees Seek Advice?  
 
STAGE 1 
Practice Session Main Session 
Advice-Seeking Unavailable Advice-Seeking Available 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Round 1 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Any employee has five opportunities to seek advice within a round if s/he has 
never sought advice in any previous periods within that round.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Figure 6 
Mediation Analysis for the Non-bottom Performers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All p-values are one-tailed. Process uses ordinal logistic regression when assessing links with an 
ordinal dependent variable.  
 
 
Confidence interval for the indirect effect:  
 
(a) Bootstrapping  
 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Indirect Effect 0.264 11.446 
 
 
(b) Monte Carlo Method 
 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Indirect Effect 0.317 10.390 
 
 
* Presented confidence interval is based on a 90% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Frequency of 
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p= 0.042 
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p= 0.009 
 
RPI 
Trust in the 
Supervisor 
C= 0.230 
p= 0.351 
 
C’= - 0.525 
p= 0.222 
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Table 1 
Test of H1 
Panel A: Frequency of Advice-Seeking - Mean (SD) 
 NO RPI RPI T-test 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (times) 
2.48 
(0.48)  
N=27 
3.81 
(0.49) 
N=27 
1.94 
p = 0.029 
 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (percentage)  
 
41.36% 
(0.41) 
N=27 
 
63.58% 
 (0.43)                    
N=27 
 
1.94 
p = 0.029 
      
Panel B: Non-Bottom Performers  
 NO RPI RPI T-test 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (times) 
3.50 
(0.52) 
N=18 
5.33 
(0.11) 
N=18 
1.93 
p = 0.031 
 
 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (percentage) 
 
49.07% 
(0.46) 
N=18 
 
 
75.93% 
(0.6) 
N=18 
 
 
1.93 
p = 0.031 
 
Panel C: Bottom Performers 
 NO RPI RPI T-test 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (times) 
1.56 
(0.55) 
N=9 
2.33 
(0.87) 
N=9 
0.76 
p = 0.230 
 
Frequency of Advice-
Seeking (percentage) 
 
25.93% 
(0.28) 
N=9 
 
 
38.89% 
(0.43) 
N=9 
 
0.76 
p = 0.230 
 
Note:  
1.  T-test for mean comparison is appropriate as it compares the mean of advice-seeking frequency.  
2.  Frequency of Advice-Seeking (times) indicate how many times an employee has sought advice in 
stage 1 and the number ranges from 0 to 6.  
3.  I calculate Frequency of Advice-Seeking (percentage) by dividing Frequency of Advice-Seeking 
(times) by 6.   
4.  All p-values are one-tailed due to directional prediction.  
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Table 2 
Test of H2 
Panel A: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Trust Proxied by Expected Return    
 Wald 𝒙𝟐 p-value 
All Employees 1.32 0.094 
Non-Bottom Performers 2.31 0.011 
Bottom Performers -0.28 0.392 
 
  Note:  
  1. All p-values are one-tailed due to directional prediction. 
  2. Expected Return is an ordinal dependent variable that ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with 10 
percent as an interval.  
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Table 3 
Non-Bottom Performers  
Panel A: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Work Trust      
 Wald 𝒙𝟐 p-value 
Non-Bottom Performers 2.93 <0.01 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Attachment  
 Wald 𝒙𝟐 p-value 
Non-Bottom Performers 4.11 <0.01 
 
 
  Note:  
  1. All p-values are two-tailed.  
  2. Work Trust – Participants are asked "Would you trust working with this manager again?” on a seven-point 
Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very much”.  
  3. Attachment – Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they feel attached to the manager on a 
seven-point Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very much”. 
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Table 4 
Test of H3  
Panel A: All Participants  
Model  
Dependent 
Variable 
1. 
Expected Return  
2. 
Frequency of 
Advice-Seeking  
 
3. 
Expected Return  
4. 
Expected Return  
RPI -0.009 
(0.493) 
0.875* 
(0.041) 
 
 -0.267 
(0.305) 
Frequency of 
Advice-Seeking 
 
 
 
 0.744 
(0.094) 
 
0.853 
(0.080) 
 
Observation 
 
 
54 
 
54 
 
54 
 
54 
 
Panel B: Non-Bottom Performers 
Model  
Dependent 
Variable 
1. 
Expected Return  
2. 
Frequency of 
Advice-Seeking  
 
3. 
Expected Return  
4. 
Expected Return  
RPI 0.230 
(0.351) 
1.102* 
(0.042) 
 
 -0.525 
(0.222) 
Frequency of 
Advice-Seeking 
 
 
 
 1.663* 
(0.011) 
 
1.949** 
(0.009) 
 
Observation 
 
 
36 
 
36 
 
36 
 
36 
 
Note:  
  1. To test ordinal dependent variables, I use ordinal logistic regression.  
  2. p-values are shown in the parentheses and are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction.  
 
